AI agent control plane
Identity, permissions, and runtime controls for AI agents.
Securie starts where risk is already visible: AI coding agents with shell, file, Git, network, and secret access. AgentGuard wraps those sessions, blocks unsafe actions, isolates credentials, authorizes tools, redacts secrets, and leaves audit evidence security teams can trust.
Available today
One command turns a coding agent into an accountable actor.
The open-source AgentGuard runtime gives teams an immediate control point around Claude Code, Codex, Cursor-style agents, Cline, OpenHands, and internal coding agents.
Why this exists
AI agents moved from chat to action. Security models did not.
Developer machines now host autonomous actors that can read repositories, run shells, call tools, browse, install packages, push branches, and interact with production-adjacent systems.
Agents can read `.env`, tokens, SSH keys, and database URLs.
AgentGuard blocks sensitive file access at the runtime boundary and redacts secret-like output before it reaches terminals, reports, or audit trails.
Agents can run destructive terminal, cloud, database, or Git commands.
Runtime policy denies dangerous patterns, approval-gates sensitive changes, and records the decision before a risky action becomes an incident.
Teams need to know which agent did what and why.
First-class agent identity turns invisible automation into attributable sessions with owners, permissions, policy decisions, and compliance evidence.
Runtime control layer
A runtime that turns agent actions into policy decisions.
The first protected path is concrete: block `.env` reads, block destructive commands, allow normal work, redact detected secrets, log file and network behavior, and render a session report.
$ agentguard run -- bash -c "cat .env && rm -rf /tmp/build"
deny file_read .env policy=no_env_reads
deny command_exec rm -rf policy=destructive_command
redact stdout AKIA... marker=[REDACTED:aws-access-key]
report session ags_01... markdown + json audit evidence
allow file_read src/main.rs policy=normal_repo_read
Control plane
A control plane for agent actions.
A wrapper alone does not answer who the agent is, what it can access, which credential it can use, which tool it can call, which actions require approval, or what happened during the session. Securie is designed to make those decisions explicit, enforceable, and auditable.
Starts with coding agents
From coding agents to every enterprise agent.
Coding agents are the first protected surface because the risk is concrete and the developer install path is fast. The same identity, policy, runtime, approval, and audit layer expands to every agent that can touch company systems.
Coding agents
Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Cline, OpenHands, Devin-style agents, internal repo agents.
DevOps and CI/CD agents
Release automation, deployment bots, test-fix agents, package-publish agents, incident runbook agents.
Cloud and database agents
AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Supabase, Postgres, warehouse, and production-access workflows.
MCP and enterprise agents
Support, finance, sales ops, HR, security, browser, SaaS, and workflow agents with scoped permissions.
Stop accidental `.env`, token, and key exposure.
Single security-critical runtime.
Wrap AI coding agents locally.
Identity, policy, approvals, audit.
Security guides
Evaluate AgentGuard against real agent risks.
Use these pages to review runtime enforcement, agent identity, approvals, audit logs, and compliance evidence before you deploy AI agents broadly.
Secure runtime for AI coding agents
How AgentGuard is designed to watch files, commands, Git, network, secrets, and child processes.
Read page Agent identityFirst-class identity for autonomous agents
Why agent IDs, owners, session IDs, risk tiers, and revocation are becoming core security primitives.
Read page Control planeIdentity, credentials, tools, policy, and audit
The enterprise control model for agents that can touch code, cloud, databases, SaaS, and MCP tools.
Read page Policy engineDeterministic policy for agent actions
Allow, deny, redact, approval-gate, alert, terminate, and log-only decisions for real agent behavior.
Read page Audit and complianceAI agent audit logs and PR reports
Evidence for security reviews, SOC 2 readiness, incident response, and enterprise questionnaires.
Read page Threat modelWhat current protections cover, and what they do not
A practical threat model for honest hallucinating agents, prompt injection, and future isolation tiers.
Read page ChecklistAI coding agent security checklist
A buyer-ready checklist for secret blocking, runtime controls, approvals, audit logs, and revocation.
Read page Claude Code securityRuntime guardrails for Claude Code
How teams should think about hooks, shell access, secrets, approvals, and audit logs around Claude Code.
Read page Codex securitySecure OpenAI Codex agent workflows
Runtime controls for Codex-style coding agents that can inspect code, run commands, and modify repositories.
Read page Cursor AI securityProtect repositories using Cursor-style agents
Guardrails for IDE-native coding assistants that can touch source code, secrets, terminals, and Git.
Read pageQuestions buyers ask
What should security teams know?
The category, threat model, and runtime controls are explicit so security teams can pressure-test what matters before broad rollout.
Is Securie just a wrapper around coding agents?
No. The runtime is the first control point. Securie also tracks agent identity, scoped permissions, deterministic policy, data protection, approvals, audit logs, integrations, and revocation so teams can govern agent work end to end.
Can AgentGuard stop `.env` reads today?
Yes on Linux for the protected runtime path. AgentGuard also blocks obvious command-level secret reads, redacts secret-like output, logs decisions, and supports Claude Code hooks.
Does this work beyond IDE coding agents?
Yes. Coding agents are the first protected surface because they already touch secrets, terminals, Git, and production-adjacent systems. The platform expands to CI/CD, cloud, database, MCP, support, finance, and internal enterprise agents.